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COMMENTS
FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS TREE: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
As VIEWED THROUGH ITS EXCEPTIONS
JEFFREY

M.

BAIN AND MICHAEL

K.

KELLY*

This comment analyzes recent developments of the "fruit of the
poisonous tree" doctrine in relation to the fourth amendment
exclusionary rule by focusing on relevant Supreme Court and
leading lower court decisions. The authors examine the "fruit"
doctrine chiefly through the lens of the exceptions which have
developed around it. While generally it is the fruit of fourth
amendment violations that is examined, some recent Supreme
Court decisions based on the fifth amendment are also discussed,
paricularly in relation to the "impeachment" exception. These
later cases help indicate the future course of judicial interpretation of the fourth amendment.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

At common law the admissibility of evidence was not affected
by the illegality of the means through which it was obtained. In 1914
this rule was changed when the Supreme Court in Weeks v. United
States' adopted the exclusionary rule. Pursuant to this rule, evidence procured by means of an unlawful search and seizure by
federal officers is not admissible against the defendant in a federal
* Former members, University of Miami Law Review.
1. 232 U.S. 383 (1914), overruled on other grounds, Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206
(1960).
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court if timely objection is made on the basis of the fourth amendment. It took the Supreme Court forty-seven years to make this rule
applicable to state criminal prosecutions, but this was accomplished in Mapp v. Ohio2 by virtue of the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. The Court has based its use of the exclusionary rule to protect a defendant's fourth amendment rights on
the assumption that it would serve to deter future police misconduct
and to prevent governmental participation in illegal conduct.
Upon adoption of the exclusionary rule, there remained the
question of whether indirect as well as direct evidence procured by
exploitation of the illegality need be suppressed. This question was
answered in 1920 in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States,
where the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine was first espoused.
The Silverthorne Court rejected the government's contention that
the United States Constitution prohibits the illegal seizure of evidence but not any advantages that the government would gain over
the defendant through information received as a result of the illegal
act. The Court explained that it was not merely that the "evidence
so acquired shall not be used before the Court but that it shall not
be used at all. "I However, the Court also stated that the facts which
had been illegally obtained could have been used if knowledge of
them had been gained from an independent source.'
This rule existed for nineteen years without a name. Then, in
Nardone v. United States,7 it was appropriately called "the fruit of

the poisonous tree" doctrine. The Nardone decision not only acknowledged the "independent source" exception to the "fruit" doctrine but also established the "attenuation" exception. By this latter exception the prosecution is free to prove that the connection
between the initial illegality and the derived evidence has become
"so attenuated as to dissipate the taint."8
In the 1963 case of Wong Sun v. United States,9 the Supreme
Court handed down a decision that has become the landmark of the
2. 367 U.S. 643, rehearing denied, 368 U.S. 871 (1961).
3. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960).
4. 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
5. Id. at 392.
6. Id.; see section II,B infra for an analysis of the "independent source" exception.
7. 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939).
8. Id. at 341; see section II,A infra for an analysis of the "attenuation" exception.
9. 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
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"fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine. The Court adopted a standard for determining whether the proferred evidence is "fruit"; the
standard is "'whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been
come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint."' " This
was the last major Supreme Court case in this area until the 1970's.

II.

EXCEPTIONS TO THE FiUIT OP THR PoISONous TREE
A.

DOCTRINE

Attenuation

The "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine comes into play when
evidence is obtained as a result, at least in part, of a fourth amendment primary illegality committed by the police. Wong Sun v.
United States, still represents the most comprehensive articulation
of the doctrine as well as the primary authority for the mitigating
circumstances of attenuation. The Court stated that the exclusionary rule has no application when "the connection between the lawless conduct of the police and the discovery of the challenged
evi'I
dence has 'become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint."'
In Wong Sun, A, shortly after being illegally arrested (without
probable cause), informed federal agents that B possessed narcotics.
When confronted by the agents, B surrendered some heroin. Additionally, B, when arrested, made statements implicating C in the
sale of narcotics. C's subsequent arrest was illegal for want of probable cause, although he was properly warned of his rights. Several
days after having been lawfully arraigned and released on his own
recognizance, C voluntarily returned to make an inculpatory statement. The federal agents conceded at trial that they would never
have found the drugs that were seized from B without the information procured from A. The Court held that the narcotics seized from
B were the fruit of both the illegal arrest and the subsequent statement of A, and should not have been admitted as evidence against
A. With respect to C's confession, however, the Court held that in
light of the fact that C had been warned of his rights, lawfully
arraigned, released on his own recognizance, and then returned voluntarily several days later to make his statement, the independent
10. Id. at 488, quoting J. MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT 221 (1959).
11. Id. at 487, quoting Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939).
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activity on C's part was sufficient to attenuate any connection between his unlawful arrest and the subsequent statement.
The Wong Sun decision, insofar as a determination of attenuation is concerned, was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Brown
v. Illinois.,1 Following his illegal arrest, the defendant was taken to
a police station where, after having been given the Miranda3 warnings, he made an incriminating statement concerning the murder
for which he was subsequently convicted. This incriminating statement was obtained less than two hours after his arrest. A second
incriminating statement was obtained about five hours after the
first statement; it also was preceded by properly administered
Miranda warnings. The state supreme court held the statements
admissible on the ground that the Miranda warnings alone broke

the causal chain so that any subsequent statement, even one induced by the continuing effects of unconstitutional custody, was
admissible as long as it was voluntary and not coerced in the traditional sense. 4 The Supreme Court rejected this per se rule and
reversed, holding that Miranda warnings do not automatically attenuate the taint of a fourth amendment violation. The Court reasoned that:
If Miranda warnings, by themselves, were held to attenuate the
taint of an unconstitutional arrest. . . the effect of the exclusionary rule would be substantially diluted . . . . [Illegal arrests]
would be encouraged by the knowledge that evidence derived
therefrom could well be made admissible at trial by the simple
expedient of giving Miranda warnings. Any incentive to avoid
Fourth Amendment violations would be eviscerated by making
the warnings, in effect, a "cure-all" .
12. 422 U.S. 590 (1975). "We could hold [the defendant's] first statement admissible
only if we overrule Wong Sun. We decline to do so." Id. at 604-05. The Court employed the
Wong Sun formulation of the rule in Brown. Id. at 599. This would seem to dispel the question
of whether the Court had intended to weaken the rule in Morales v. New York, 396 U.S. 102
(1969) (per curiam), where the Court stated that on remand the state might show that the
defendant's "confrontation with the police was voluntarily undertaken," or that "the confessions were not the product of illegal detention." Id. at 105.
13. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 486 (1966).
14. People v. Brown, 56 Ill. 2d 312, 307 N.E.2d 356 (1974).
15. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. at 602 (footnotes omitted). Accord, People v. Sesslin, 68
Cal. 2d 418, 439 P.2d 321, 67 Cal. Rptr. 409 (1968). This position has support among a large
number of commentators. The following are cited in Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. at 602 n.7:
Pitler, "The Fruit of the Poisonous Tree" Revisisted and Shepardized, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 579,

603-04 (1968); Ruflin, Out on a Limb on the Poisonous Tree: The Tainted Witness, 15
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In determining whether there has been attenuation under Wong
Sun, the facts of each case must be examined.'" Although Miranda
warnings are to be considered in determining whether a confession
has been obtained by exploitation of an illegal arrest, neither that
7 The Brown
nor any other single fact is universally dispositive.1
Court mentioned that other factors 8 to be considered include the
temporal proximity of the primary illegality and the alleged fruit,"8
the purposefulness and offensiveness of the primary illegality, 0 the
voluntariness of any confession, the causal connection, if any, between the primary illegality and the alleged fruit," and intervening
U.C.L.A.L. REV. 32, 70 (1967); Comment, 1 FLA. ST. L. REV. 533, 539-40 (1973); Note,
Admissibility of Confessions Made Subsequent to an Illegal Arrest: Wong Sun v. United
States Revisited, 61 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S., 207, 212 n.58 (1970); Comment, Scope of Taint
Under the Exclusionary Rule of the Fifth Amendment PrivilegeAgainst Self-Incrimination.
114 U. PA. L. REV. 570, 574 (1966).
The Supreme Court of California has distinguished instances where the primary illegality
is an illegal search and seizure as opposed to an illegal arrest, with regard to the effect that
Miranda warnings have upon attenuating a subsequent confession. People v. Johnson, 70 Cal.
2d 541, 450 P.2d 865, 75 Cal. Rptr. 401, cert. denied, 395 U.S. 969 (1969). In Johnson, the
court stated that where the instance of primary illegality is an illegal arrest, Miranda warnings are one factor to be considered in determining whether the confession is inadmissible as
"fruit." This is in accord with the Brown holding. However, in Johnson, the primary illegality
was an illegal search and seizure. The court intimated, although not clearly, that in such a
case, Miranda warnings were per se ineffectual in attenuating a subsequent confession because the evidence obtained in an illegal search induces the confession by showing the suspect
the futility of remaining silent.
Although the Brown case dealt with an illegal arrest, and language in the opinion referred
to an "illegal arrest," a clear distinction was never made as to whether the holding applied
to only instances where the primary illegality was an illegal arrest, or whether it applied to
illegal search and seizures as well. The spirit of the opinion would seem to indicate that the
latter is the case. Thus, the continued efficacy of the Johnson suggestion is questionable. On
policy grounds, the desirability of a per se no-attenuation rule is also questionable. Although
the taint of an illegal search and seizure may spread further than an illegal arrest, when the
suspected fruit is a confession it would seem wiser to vest the attenuation question upon the
facts of each case, rather than confine it by presumptions, whether rebuttable or conclusive.
16. "Application of the Wong Sun doctrine will generate fact-specific cases bearing
distinct differences as well as similarities, and the question of attenuation inevitably is largely
a matter of degree." Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. at 609.
17. Id. at 603; see People v. Johnson, 70 Cal. 2d 541, 450 P.2d 865, 75 Cal. Rptr. 401
(1969); State v. Newell, 462 S.W.2d 794 (Mo. 1971); Pitler, supra note 15, at 601-04.
18. 422 U.S. at 603-04.
19. Contra, United States v. Williams, 436 F.2d 1166, 1171 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
402 U.S. 912 (1971).
20. The Court in Brown found the obvious impropriety of the arrest (an investigatory
arrest) and apparent bad faith of the police quite relevant in determining the question of
attenuation. 422 U.S. at 605. See the concurring opinion of Powell, J., id. at 606-08.
21. See United States v. Bacall, 443 F.2d 1050 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004
(1971) (evidence obtained without substantial resort to any clue or knowledge gained from
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circumstances such as release and voluntary return as in Wong Sun.
Beyond a statement of the attenuation rule of Wong o un and a
general description of the various factors to be considered in determining whether the "taint has been purged,"it is difficult to discuss
the attenuation doctrine since it is so dependent upon the particular
facts of each case.
An interesting fact pattern where attenuation came under consideration and which further illustrates the application of the doctrine was United States v. Williams,"2 where the defendant was
illegally arrested on a charge unrelated to the bank robbery charge
for which he was tried. The police went to a neighbor's apartment
to ask her to care for defendant's pets. Voluntarily, the neighbor
provided information that connected defendant with the bank robbery. The police conducted a second search of the apartment which
produced other evidence connecting the defendant with the robbery.
It was held that the evidence was sufficiently attenuated from the
illegal arrest.
In analyzing this type of case, it is important to remember that
the Wong Sun test is not a "but for" test.2" Rather the question is
whether the evidence has been obtained by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint. 4 As applied to the
facts in Williams, it is arguable that there was sufficient attenuation
because the neighbor's statement leading to the evidence of the
bank robbery was not obtained by exploitation of the illegality. The
police had no investigative intent when they approached her, and,
furthermore her statement was completely voluntary. In this particular fact pattern, given the clear break in the causal chain of events
of the investigation, the temporal proximity of the illegal arrest to
the alleged fruit is not material."
the illegal seizure); United States v. Stornini, 443 F.2d 833 (1st Cir.) (no causal nexus between
the illegal search and the simultaneous legal search), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 861 (1971).
22. 436 F.2d 1166 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 912 (1971).
23. "We need not hold that all evidence is 'fruit of the poisonous tree' simply because it
would not have come to light but for the illegal actions of the police." Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. at 487-88.
24. Id. at 488.
25. But see Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. at 599, where temporal proximity was a material
factor in determining the spread of the taint. See also Commonwealth v. Cephas, 447 Pa. 500,
509, 291 A.2d 106, 111 (1972) ("The primary question ... when dealing with the taint issue,
as herein presented, is not whether the witness voluntarily plead guilty and testified but
rather it is why she chose to do this."); United States ex rel. Pugach v. Mancusi, 310 F.
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There is some authority to the effect that one aspect of the
attenuation doctrine operates under distinct guidelines: Whether a
tainted decision to focus an investigation on a particular suspect
necessarily taints any further investigation and prosecution arising
5 federal agents, through
therefrom. In United States v. Friedland,"
the use of an illegal wiretap, learned of certain criminal activities
of the defendant (judge fixing and fencing), which were different
from the illegality for which he was eventually prosecuted (counterfeit bond scheme). Assuming that the counterfeit securities squad
was thus put on notice that the defendant was the type of person
that would bear watching, the court nevertheless held that he was
not immunized from "investigation of different criminal activities
and from prosecution on the basis of facts about them learned in a
lawful way." 27 The Court quoted with approval Judge Learned
Hand's formula of the test in United States v. Nardone:
The question therefore comes down to this: whether a prosecution
must show, not only that it has not used any information illicitly
obtained, either as evidence, or as the means of procuring evidence; but that the information has not itself spurred the authorities to press an investigation which they might otherwise have
dropped. We do not believe that the Supreme Court meant to
involve the prosecution of crime in such a tenebrous and uncertain inquiry, or to make such a fetish of the [wiretapping] statute as so extreme an application of it would demand.r
Judge Friendly stated that Judge Hand's statement of the question in Nardone was not undermined by Wong Sun.30 Although
Supp. 691, 711 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) ("[Tlhe admissions were not the fruit of trespassing, but of
the agents' representation that they would inform the police of information incriminating the
petitioner."), aff'd, 441 F.2d 1073 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 849 (1971).
26. 441 F.2d 855 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 867 (1971). The Friedland court's
misapplication of the independent source exception is discussed infra at text accompanying
notes 41-53.
27. 441 F.2d at 859.
28. 127 F.2d 521 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 698 (1942).
29. Id. at 523, cited in United States v. Friedland, 441 F.2d at 859. Judge Hand's statement was also quoted with approval in United States v. Balistrieri, 403 F.2d 472, 477 (7th
Cir. 1968), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 395 U.S. 710 (1969), in light of Alderman
v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969), and Giordano v. United States, 394 U.S. 310 (1969).
The significance of the remand is discussed in United States v. Friedland, 441 F.2d at 80
n.7.
30. 441 F.2d at 859. "We see no basis for thinking that . . .the Nardone decision has
been 'undermined' by any decision of the Supreme Court or this court." Id. Nonetheless, the
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Judge Hand's formulation enunciates a situation in which attenuation must be found, in contrast to the more relative and nonconclusory nature of the Wong Sun formulation, both are in agreement on
the point that the test for attenuation is not a "but for" test.',
However, the Hand formulation is subject to criticism for being
overly rigid and not designed to take into account the various facts
of each case in determining the question of attenuation.2 The difficulty is that the courts must balance the constitutional interest in
deterring police misconduct with the societal interest in stopping
crime." The Court believed the deterrent effect of the exclusionary
rule would not be impaired significantly enough by excluding the
evidence to justify the cost to society of granting the defendants lifelong immunity from investigation and prosecution. 4
B.

Independent Source

As early as 1920 the Supreme Court in Silverthorne Lumber Co.
v. United States" recognized the "independent source" exception.
The Court later stated in Wong Sun the rule that the "fruit of the
poisonous tree" doctrine has no application when the Government
test announced in Wong Sun, which focuses on police exploitation of the illegality, does seem
to significantly expand the area which can be tainted by an unlawful search and seizure.
Some courts within recent years have felt it their duty to engage in what Judge Hand would
have described as "tenebrous and uncertain inquiry" where constitutional rights are involved.
31. See United States v. Bacall, 443 F.2d 1050, 1057 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1004 (1971); People v. Pettis, 12 Ill. App. 3d 123, 298 N.E.2d 372 (App. Ct. 1973).
32. If the Hand formualtion is carefully applied, it does seem to have certain elements
of flexibility built in. But it is not clear where the demarcation is between evidence procured
from the primary illegality and evidence ultimately obtained as a result of a "spurred investigation." Furthermore, it is not a simple matter to determine when an investigation is one
that "might have been dropped." Thus, the greatest danger of the Hand formulation is in
its application in a blind "if ... then" fashion.
33. United States v. Friedland, 441 F.2d at 861. Analyzing the fruit of the poisonous tree
issue in terms of deterrence theory has been advocated by Professor Robert M. Pitler. It is
his belief that Wong Sun's formulation of the rule in terms of "purging the primary taint"
obfuscates the relevant question-whether the admission of the secondary evidence will significantly encourage police misconduct in the future. Pitler, supra note 15, at 588-89. See,
Note, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 1136, 1147 (1967).
34. United States v. Friedland, 441 F.2d at 861; see United States v. Cole, 325 F. Supp.
763 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd, 463 F.2d 163 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 942 (1972), holding
that the Government's learning from electronic surveillance that an organized crime suspect
habitually evaded his taxes did not taint evidence of tax violations that were committed in
subsequent years, even though investigation of the suspect may have been intensified as a
result of the eavesdropping.

35. 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
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learns of the evidence from an "independent source." :"
When the "independent source" is separate and distinct from
the illegal source the courts have held, in a number of diverse situations in the 1970's, that the evidence need not be suppressed. 7 The
rationale behind this is typified by Chief Judge Sobeloff's comments
in Sutton v. United States.:" "Itis one thing to say that officers shall
gain no advantage from violating the individual's rights: it is quite
another to declare that such a violation shall put him beyond the
law's reach even if his guilt can be proved by evidence that has been
obtained lawfully."
The problem with the "independent source" exception arises
when the illegal source and the legal source of the evidence are so
comingled as to make it questionable whether the legal source is
truly an "independent source." 39 There is some authority to the
effect that "where the illegally obtained leads are the 'but for' cause
of the investigation, the resultant evidence will be suppressed."' "
The "but for" test in the area of "independent source" has
apparently been rejected by the circuits in two cases, United States
v. Friedland4 ' and United States v. Bacall.4" The question presented
to the court in Friedland was whether evidence should be suppressed as the product of an investigation precipitated by information obtained through illegal eavesdropping. The prosecution contended that this was a case in which the "independent source"
exception should apply, notwithstanding that the evidence had
been the product of legal and illegal leads. The court agreed with
36. 371 U.S. at 487.
37. E.g., United States v. San Martin, 469 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1972) (held that evidence from
the subsequent surveillance of the defendant was not tainted by a prior illegal wiretap since
the government had an independent source for evidence of defendant's involvement in the
heroin operation); United States v. Brandon, 467 F.2d 1008 (9th Cir. 1972) (held that a
preexisting report from an informant, which led to a proper search of defendant's home and
the discovery of counterfeiting plates, was sufficient to purge the taint of an illegal search of
defendant's automobile which led to discovery of counterfeit bills).
38. 267 F.2d 271, 272 (4th Cir. 1959).
39. There is a similar problem where courts are presented with both legal and illegal
evidence to be used as probable cause for the issuance of a warrant. In this situation, the
courts have not actually examined the question of whether the legal evidence is independent
of the illegal evidence but have merely asked whether the legal evidence in and of itself
provided probable cause sufficient for the issuance of a warrant. See, e.g., United States v.
Langley, 466 F.2d 27 (6th. Cir. 1972); James v. United States, 418 F.2d 1150 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
40. 74 COLUM. L. REV. 88, 94 (1974).
41. 441 F.2d 855 (2d Cir. 1971).
42. 443 F.2d 1050 (9th Cir. 1971).

624
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the prosecution's contention and held that it was unnecessary to
show that the illegal information did not spur an investigation
which might otherwise have been dropped." Thus, the court rejected a "but for" test in the area of "independent source."
The Ninth Circuit in Bacall supported the Second Circuit in its
apparent rejection of the "but for" test.4 In Bacall, United States
Customs agents illegally seized inventory (i.e. fabrics) from the defendant. The agents subsequently sent a letter to the French Customs Bureau which asked the French Bureau to investigate a matter
relating to the defendant Bacall. In the course of their investigation, French agents seized certain letters and checks which implicated the defendant in certain crimes. At trial, the defendant attempted to suppress these checks and letters as "fruits" of the illegal seizure of the fabrics. The defendant argued that the American
agent would not have requested the French investigation "but for"
the information obtained through the seizure and subsequent inventory and that the French investigation would not have taken place
"but for" the agent's request.
While assuming that the "but for" put forth by the defendant
was true, the Bacall court held that it did not determine the issue
of suppression." The court then set down criteria to aid its determination of whether the evidence sought to be admitted could be
purged of the primary taint. First, the evidence must "in fact" be
obtained through an "independent source."" Second, the evidence
must be obtained without resort to any clue or knowledge gained
from the items unlawfully seized. 7 Third, the evidence must be
discovered through "substantial" legal leads where the leads were
both legal and illegal." The question here is the precise role the
illegal seizure "in fact" played in the subsequent discovery. Fourth,
the evidence must be obtained through an investigation that was
not intensified by reason of any tainted information. 9 Fifth, the
evidence must not be the product of an offensive police actionY'
43. 441 F.2d at 860.
44. 443 F.2d at 1056.
45. Id. The same point was made by the court in United States v. Friedland, 441 F.2d
at 85960.
46. 443 F.2d at 1056, citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963).
47. 443 F.2d at 1056.citing Standard Oil Co. v. Iowa, 408 F.2d 1171, 1177 (8th Cir. 1969).
48. 443 F.2d at 1056, citing James v. United States, 418 F.2d 1150, 1152 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
49. 443 F.2d at 1057, citing United States v. Schipani, 414 F.2d 1262, 1266 (2d Cir. 1969).
50. 443 F.2d at 1057, citing Comment, Fruitof the Poisonous Tree-A Plea for Relevant
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None of these criteria was itself deemed determinative of the issue.
The court applied the above criteria to the facts at hand and
concluded that the discovery of the letters and checks was not
wholly "independent" of the unlawful seizure. However, the evidence was obtained through substantial leads without resort to a
clue or knowledge gained from the illegally seized items. Moreover,
the inquiry was not intensified by reason of any tainted information
nor was the initial illegality overly offensive." Based on these findings, the court ruled against suppression of the evidence.5 2
The "independent source" exception was initiated only to protect the government where its source is developed through honest
police efforts and not where its evidence is developed through a
mixture of good and bad police work. Although the defendant
should not be given life-long immunity from investigation, the police should not be able to profit from their wrongdoings. It is not a
question of how "substantial" the legal leads are.53 It is a matter of
deterrence. If the police know that their initial illegality can be
covered up later by legal police work, what is there to stop them
from committing the initial illegality?
C.

Inevitable Discovery

The "inevitable discovery" exception to the "fruits" doctrine is
the most innovative and controversial exception. This exception is
based on a showing that "the government undoubtedly would have
(probably would have) (could have) (might have) lawfully discovered the "tainted" evidence"5 4 by lawful means. Through this exception, the prosecutor is allowed to cure any original "taint" that
might have attached to the evidence thus making it admissible in
the face of the "taint."
The "inevitable discovery" exception gives rise to a two-level
controversy. The first level is whether or not the inevitable discovery
exception should be recognized in any form. Because the Supreme
Criteria, 115 U. PA L. REV. 1136, 1151 (1967).
51. 443 F.2d at 1057-61.
52. Id. at 1061.
53. The Bacall court contended that the substantiality of the legal leads should be a
criteria in determining independent source. 443 F.2d at 1056.
54. KAMISAR, LA FAVE, AND ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 702 (4th ed. 1974). The

reason for the choice of words in this definition will become evident later in the section.
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Court has never issued a majority opinion dealing with this issue, 5
the lower courts are left to decide this issue in any manner they feel
is appropriate.
A majority of the reported cases since 1970 have recognized the
viability of the exception." A problem arises when one examines the
basis for these decisions. Several of the courts 7 based their acceptance of the exception on the language of the Supreme Court in Wong
Sun." The Seventh Circuit went so far as to claim that the Supreme
Court itself had "added a third dimension, sometimes referred to as
the inevitability test." 9
It is arguable that these courts have misplaced their reliance on
Wong Sun, in upholding this exception. The Court in Wong Sun
appears to have emphasized positive actions as opposed to hypo-

thetical probabilities. The Court spoke in terms of "whether ....
the evidence . . . has been come at . . .by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint," 0 not whether the
evidence "could or would have been come at." The majority of the
courts"' would have you believe that the Wong Sun Court meant the
latter.
It is submitted that it is quite reasonable to assume that the
Wong Sun Court would not have condoned this "liberal" interpretation of its holding. Justice White's dissent from the denial of certorari in People v. Fitzpatrick" supports this assumption. Justice
55. However, in a case wherein the majority denied certiorari, Justice White, joined by
Justice Douglas, spoke to the issue in his dissent. People v. Fitzpatrick, 32 N.Y.2d 499, 300
N.E.2d 139, 346 N.Y.S.2d 793, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1050 (1973).
56. E.g., United States ex rel. Owens v. Twomey, 508 F.2d 858 (7th Cir. 1974); Virgin
Islands v. Gereau, 502 F.2d 914 (3d Cir. 1974); United States v. Falley, 489 F.2d 33 (2d Cir.
1973); United States v. Jackson, 448 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1971).
57. United States ex rel. Owens v. Twomey, 508 F.2d 858, 865 (7th Cir. 1974); United
States v. Falley, 489 F.2d 33, 40-41 (2d Cir. 1973).
58. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963).
59. United States ex rel. Owens v. Twomey, 508 F.2d 858, 865 (7th Cir. 1974).
60. 371 U.S. at 488.
61. United States ex rel. Owens v. Twomey, 508 F.2d 858, 865 (7th Cir. 1974); United
States v. Falley, 489 F.2d 33, 40 (2d Cir. 1973).
62. 414 U.S. 1050 (1973). In Fitzpatrick, the highest court in New York applied the
"inevitable discovery" rule to the facts at hand and found that
it was entirely fortuitous that the police delayed the search of the immediate area
where the defendant was discovered until they had begun questioning him and,
as a result, very quickly learned where the gun was located. It is quite unreal to
suggest that, but for the defendant's admission, the police would not have looked
for incriminating evidence in the closet where he had been hiding. . . .Since,
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White, joined by Mr. Justice Douglas, argued that it would be "a
significant constitutional question whether the independent source
exception to admissibility of fruits, Wong Sun . . .encompasses a
hypothetical as well as an actual independent source."" ' The Justices did not seem to think that Wong Sun had decided the constitutional question of whether the "inevitable discovery" exception is
viable. To condone this interpretation of Wong Sun would stretch
too far the exceptions laid down in that case. It is one thing to have
an exception based on fact, such as the independent source exception, and quite another to have it based on conjecture. A prominent
New York judge rightly claimed that the acceptance of the
"inevitable discovery" exception "results in a speculative theory
with no discernable limits."" The judge further observed that "the
normal course of police investigation differs greatly from one police
department to another and even within departments, so theoretically at least the constitutional standard would differ from locale to
locale.""5 If the question of admission of evidence is to turn on the
"alleged" competence of the police department in question and
their hypothetical ability to uncover the evidence sans illegality, is
the court to first judge this degree of competence and then apply the
degree to the facts at hand? Or, if the common standard of "normal
use of police procedure" similar in application to the "reasonable
man" standard used in negligence cases is to be applied, should a
poorly operated police department be given the benefit of the standard or a highly successful police department be held back by this
standard? It is submitted that when these types of guidelines are
used, the police have no actual guidelines to follow in their work. "
In the absence of guidelines, the deterrence theory that is normally
then, a search of the closet was inevitable regardless of the defendant's answers
to questions put to him beyond its confines, it may not fairly be said that the
police "exploited" the "illegality" involved in their interrogation.
32 N.Y.2d at 507, 300 N.E.2d at 142, 346 N.Y.S.2d at 797.
63. 414 U.S. at 1051.
64. People v. Fitzpatrick, 32 N.Y.2d 499, 513, 300 N.E.2d 139, 146, 346 N.Y.S.2d 793,
803 (Wachtler, J., concurring), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1050 (1973).
65. Id. at 514, 300 N.E.2d at 146, 346 N.Y.S.2d at 803.
66. Id. Judge Wachtler cited other reasons for his rejection of the inevitable discovery
rule: (1) the doctrine might be expanded too far; (2) the doctrine cannot be applied with any
consistency on a case by case basis; and (3) "even if wR could be fairly certain that a
subsequent police search would turn up the evidence, we could not be certain that the search
would have been conducted in a constitutional manner." Id. at 514, 300 N.E.2d at 146-47,
346 N.Y.S.2d at 803-04.
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referred to as the basis of the exclusionary rule and the "fruits"
doctrine "7 will not be served. The Fifth Circuit concurs with this
opinion to the extent that: "To admit unlawfully obtained evidence
on the strength of some judge's speculation that it would have been
discovered legally anyway would be to cripple the exclusionary rule
as a deterrent to improper police conduct.""
Assuming arguendo that the "inevitable discovery" rule is
deemed viable, the second level of the controversy arises. The issue
here is which word to use in defining "inevitable discovery":
"could", "would", or "probably would." The decision of a court as
to which word to use in the "inevitable discovery" test determines
the degree of probability necessary to a finding that the exception
is applicable in the case at hand.
The majority of the courts that have utilized the exception have
tended to define the necessary probability in terms of "would." '"9
The Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedures, a work published
in an attempt to influence courts and legislatures, defined the same
probability in terms of "probably would." 7
As noted above, the authors are of the opinion that the
"inevitable discovery" rule is not viable as being too speculative and
as such should not be applied by the courts. If the rule is to be
applied, the application should be in terms of the narrowest restriction which affords the least speculation. For this reason, if driven
to a choice among the alternatives, "would" is the lesser of several
"evils."'" If the "probably" test were applied, rarely would any evidence derived from an illegality be excluded, and the "fruits" doctrine would lose virtually all its power as a deterrent.72
67. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960).
68. United States v. Castellana, 488 F.2d 65, 68 (5th Cir.), modified, 500 F.2d 325 (5th
Cir. 1974) (en banc).
69. E.g., United States ex rel. Owens v. Twomey, 508 F.2d 858 (7th Cir. 1974); Virgin
Islands v. Gereau, 502 F.2d 914 (3d Cir. 1974); United States v. Falley, 489 F.2d 33 (2d Cir.
1973); United States v. Jackson, 448 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1971).
70. MODEL PENAL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 290.2(3) (Official Draft No.
1, July 1972); MODEL PENAL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 150.4 (Tentative Draft
No. 6, 1974). These sections provide that any fruits of unlawful searches and illegally obtained
statements (confessions or otherwise) will be subject to suppression "unless the prosecution
establishes that such evidence would probably have been discovered by law enforcement
authorities irrespective of such (illegalities) and the court finds that exclusion of such evidence is not necessary to deter violations of this Code."

71. This is hased on the assumption that the use of the word "would" calls for a lesser
degree of speculation than the other two suggested words. Pitler, supra note 15, at 628.
72. The reasoning of Pitler supra note 15, is applicable here:
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As the Supreme Court has not as yet addressed itself to the
"inevitable discovery" issue," it is interesting to speculate as to how
the Court would decide the issue. The present Court has already
evidenced a desire to restrict the exclusionary rule while expanding
the exceptions to the "fruits" doctrine." Using the "balancing test"
espoused by this Court,75 the Court would probably find that the
added deterrent effect of letting in illegal evidence that would or
could have been inevitably discovered is outweighed by the need
served by the exception: the need being to recognize "potential"
good police practice and not let another criminal loose on the streets
(i.e. to protect society). This result would once again sacrifice an
individual's rights for the so-called "good of society." It is questionable whether this should be done.
D.

Witness as Fruit

"Witness" is not strictly speaking an exception to the "fruit of
the poisonous tree" doctrine," but it is an important area in which
the courts have attempted to circumvent the doctrine." The testimony of a witness is considered poisoned when his identity is discovered as a result of some initial illegality.
Some cases since 1970 have excluded testimony on this basis.7
For the present, the exclusionary rule, designed to discourage illegal police activity, is useless if the police may unlawfully invade a man's home, illegally seize
evidence and then claim "we would have obtained it anyway." The ability of
police scientists, laboratory technicians, and investigators to discover, analyze,
and develop substantial leads from minute materials appears to make even the
most implausible discovery virtually inevitable. The exclusionary rule is designed
to encourage the development of such methods, not make their theoretical availability a reason for admitting illegally-seized evidence.
Id. at 630.
73. As pointed out before in this section, some courts feel that the Supreme Court
addressed this question in Wong Sun; see text accompanying notes 57-61, supra.
74. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
75. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603 (1975); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 448
(1974).
76. Unlike the other exceptions analyzed in this article (i.e., independent source, attenuation, inevitable discovery, and impeachment), the courts have never referred to it as an
exception per se.
77. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974); United States v. Marder, 474 F.2d 1192
(5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Hoffman, 385 F.2d 501 (7th Cir. 1967); Smith v. United
States, 324 F.2d 879 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
78. United States v. Barragan-Martinez, 504 F.2d 1155 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v.
Guana-Sanchez, 484 F.2d 590 (7th Cir. 1973).
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7" and United
For example, in United States v. Barragan-Martinez
s°
States v. Guana-Sanchez the defendants were stopped by the police while operating motor vehicles. Passengers in the vehicle subsequently testified against the defendants. In each case the court
ruled that the police did not have probable cause to stop the automobiles,' and therefore the passengers' statements incriminating
the defendants must be suppressed as "fruits" of the illegality."2 In
Guana-Sanchez the prosecution had attempted to differentiate between those situations where the evidence derived is tangible and
those where it is intangible 3 (i.e. witness' statements). Basing its
ruling on Wong Sun," the court refused to make this distinction and
suppressed the passengers' statements. 5 The Wong Sun Court refused to distinguish between physical and verbal evidence because
the policies underlying the exclusionary rule applied with equal
force to both."8 The Barragan-Martinezcourt suppressed the evidence to encourage the government "not to stop vehicles without at
least a founded suspicion that the vehicle's occupants are or have
been engaged in criminal conduct." 7
In the majority of the cases reported prior to 1970, testimony
derived from police misconduct has been excluded." However, in

79. 504 F.2d 1155 (9th Cir. 1974).
80. 484 F.2d 590 (7th Cir. 1973).
81. Judge Kiley, who wrote the decision in Guana-Sanchez, wryly observed that there
was no crime of "investigation" for which a person could be arrested, nor any crime in
speaking Spanish or being Mexican or Puerto Rican. 484 F.2d at 592 n.3.
82. United States v. Barragan-Martinez, 504 F.2d 1155, 1157 (9th Cir. 1974); United
States v. Guana-Sanchez, 484 F.2d 590, 592 (7th Cir. 1973).
83. This argument by the prosecution is supported by Judge Pell in his dissenting opinion. The Judge believes that the exclusionary rule should not be extended as to make witnesses to a crime incompetent to testify. He suggests that the rationale of the exclusionary
rule will not be served to exclude this competent witness nor add to the deterrent effect. 484
F.2d at 593-94.
84. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
85. 484 F.2d at 592.
86. 371 U.S. at 485-86. Justice Egan of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania went so far
as to say that in some cases there is more reason for suppression based on the deterrence
rationale because the testimony of the witness is more valuable to the government than is
the fact that the appellant was in possession of certain tangible objects that could incriminate
him. Commonwealth v. Cephas, 447 Pa. 500, 511, 291 A.2d 106, 112 (1972).
87. 504 F.2d at 1157-58.
88. E.g., People v. Martin, 382 II. 192, 46 N.E.2d 997 (1942); accord, People v. Mickelson, 59 Cal. 2d 448, 380 P.2d 658, 30 Cal. Rptr. 18 (1963); People v. Schaumloffel, 53 Cal. 2d
96, 346 P.2d 393 (1959); People v. Mills, 148 Cal. App. 2d 392, 306 P.2d 1005 (1957); Abbott
v. United States, 138 A.2d 485 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1958); People v. Schmoll, 383 Ill.
280,
48 N.E.2d 933 (1943).
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several cases the courts have allowed its admission.89 In one leading
case, Smith v. United States,9" it was quite clear that the police had
exploited the initial illegality to procure the identity of the Witness.
Therefore, based on Wong Sun, the testimony should have been
excluded.' Not wanting to exclude this testimony, the court looked
to the "attenuation" doctrine as a basis for determining the effect
of the exclusionary rule. 2 In this case, this "attenuation" was
gleaned as a result of the witness' initial reluctance to testify." This
court reasoned that the witnegs' battle with his conscience to overcome his initial reluctance provided sufficient "attenuation." One
court set down a test of "how great a part the particular manifestation of 'individual human personality' played in the ultimate receipt
of the testimony in question."94 Therefore, prior to 1970, the witness
as a "fruit" exception was not a true exception but merely an aspect
of the "attenuation" exception."5
This use of the "attenuation" exception continued in the
1970's. In 1973, the Fifth Circuit painstakingly tried to explain the
use of the exception in this area." In United States v. Marder, the
identification of a key government witness was discovered by illegal
search and seizure. 7 The court stated that it followed the "general
rule" that if the identity of the witness and his relationship to the
defendant were revealed because of an illegal search and seizure,
then his testimony must be excluded. The court based its conclusion upon the reasoning of Justice Holmes that:
89. United States v. Hoffman, 385 F.2d 501 (7th Cir. 1967); Smith v. United States, 324
F.2d 879 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
90. 324 F.2d 879 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
91. 371 U.S. at 485-86.
92. See section II,A, supra, for a more complete analysis of the "attenuation" doctrine.
93. In Smith, the witness originally refused to testify at a coroner's hearing or before a
grand jury. The court used this "attenuation" exception to distinguish the case from Wong
Sun finding that in, Wong Sun the production of the narcotics was under the "compulsion"
of the arrest whereas the witness in Smith made a voluntary choice after personal reflection.
This attenuation exception was also utilized in United States v. Hoffman, 385 F.2d 501 (7th
Cir. 1967). In Hoffman, the court observed that proof that the witness would have come
forward by his own volition, regardless of his identification by the illegal search would be
extremely relevant to a determination of "attenuation."
94. McLindon v. United States, 329 F.2d 238, 241 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
95. A true exception is one that exists on its own basis and rationale. See, Pitler supra
note 15.
96. United States v. Marder, 474 F.2d 1192 (5th Cir. 1973).
97. The phone of the defendant Marder had been illegally wiretapped, and his conversation disclosed the names of the witnesses.
98. 474 F.2d at 1195, citing Williams v. United States, 382 F.2d 48 (5th Cir. 1967).
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The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence
in a certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not
be used before the Court but that it shall not be used at all. Of
course this does not mean that the facts thus obtained become
sacred and inaccessible. If knowledge of them is gained from an
independent source they may be proved like any others, but the
knowledge gained by the Government's own wrong cannot be
used by it in the way proposed."
However, the court refused to "adopt a per se rule which would
ipso facto preclude the utilization of all testimony of a witness identified as a consequence of an illegal search."'"' The court recognized
that the rule espoused by Holmes had been somewhat qualified by
the "attenuation" exception."'
The Marder court's refinement of this use of the "attenuation"
rule came in its explanation of its application. The court suggested
that the same basic rule of exclusion followed from an illegal search
no matter what the derivative evidence is." 2 The court concluded
that different types of evidence would be treated differently in one
respect: "[T]he type of evidence seized will undoubtedly determine the circumstances that must be considered in determining
whether the original taint has been so attenuated, that its exclusion
is no longer mandated."'' 3 Where the evidence is "live testimony,"
the court refused to adopt "rigid rules" but enumerated two factors
to be considered in each case: first, proof that the witness would
have come forward by himself; second, evidence of the overcoming
of the witness' initial reluctance to testify. 0 4 In setting down these
factors, the court appears to have adopted the same test used in the
1960's.'"5
99. 474 F.2d at 1195, citing Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392
(1920) (emphasis added by the Marder Court).
100. 474 F.2d at 1196.
101. The court cited Justice Brennan's well known qualification of the fruits doctrine.
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. at 487-88. The court held that the testimony must be
excluded unless the government can show that the identity of the witness discovered from
the original illegal seizure has become so attentuated as to remove the original taint.
102. 474 F.2d at 1196, citing Rogers v. United States, 330 F.2d 535, 540-41 (5th Cir. 1964).
The evidence may be "animate or inanimate, tangible or intangible."
103. 474 F.2d at 1196.
104. Id. The court concluded that "each case must be examined on an ad hoc basis,
considering the particular facts presented, rather than on any sweeping general concept of
'live testimony' as such." Id., quoting United States v. Evans, 454 F.2d 813, 818 (8th Cir.
1972).
105. The court appears to be following the rationale of United States v. Hoffman, 385
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The arguments espoused against expansion of the
"attenuation" rule are applicable here. 08 Furthermore, the admission of evidence upon proof that the witness would have come forward of his own volition appears to be an unwarranted extension of
the "inevitable discovery" exception rather than a part of the
"attenuation" exception. When one is asked to prove that the witness "would have come forward," he is being asked to prove a hypothetical and not a fact. The preservation of one's rights should not
turn on a hypothetical, and the arguments against the "inevitable
discovery" exception apply here. 01 Evidence that the witness' initial
reluctance to testify has been overcome also should be disregarded
as irrelevant to a finding of "taint" or "attenuation." When the
witness is illegally uncovered, his discovery. itself is tainted. His
later decision to talk does not make him any less of a "tainted"
witness in relation to the defendant. 08
. As noted herein, courts have not made "witness as a fruit" an
exception in itself' 09 when the illegality is of constitutional proportions. However, the Supreme Court in 1974 went so far as to make
it an apparent exception in one certain area." 0 In Michigan v.
Tucker the Supreme Court examined nonconstitutional illegalities
as the "tree" of the "poisonous" witness. In Tucker, the defendant,
who had been arrested for rape, was questioned by the police. Before
the interrogation began, the defendant was advised of his right to
remain silent and his right to counsel, but not of his right to the
appointment of counsel, if he was indigent. Defendant named one
Henderson as his alibi witness, but Henderson later gave information tending to incriminate the defendant. Before trial, the defendant moved to exclude Henderson's testimony because he had revealed Henderson's identity without having received the full warning mandated by the Miranda decision."' The motion was denied,
F.2d 501 (7th Cir. 1967) and Smith v. United States, 324 F.2d 879 (D.C. Cir. 1963); see Pitler,
supra note 15, for a more complete discussion and analysis of the Smith test.
106. See section II,A supra.
107. See section 1I,C supra.
108. Accord, Commonwealth v. Cephas, 447 Pa. 500, 291 A.2d 106 (1972).
109. See notes 93 and 95 supra, and accompanying text.
110. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
111. Id. at 436-37, citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Although the defendant was questioned prior to Miranda the Court acknowledged that he still had to be read
his Miranda rights based on the Court's ruling in Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966),
that the Miranda ruling was retroactive. 417 U.S. at 447-48.
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defendant was convicted and his convictions affirmed by both the
Michigan Court of Appeals"' and the Michigan Supreme Court."'
Defendant sought habeas relief, and it was granted by the district
court which found that Henderson's testimony was inadmissible,
being "fruits of the poisonous tree.""' The United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed." '
The Supreme Court, per Justice Rehnquist, overturned the decision. The Court reasoned that the initial omission did not violate
the fifth amendment and was therefore not a constitutional violation." The Miranda warnings were held to be only a "set of specific
protective guidelines

. . .

to provide practical reinforcement for the

right against compulsory self-incrimination""' and were "not themselves rights protected by the Constitution.""' The Court found
that, under the facts of the case, the police conduct did not deprive
defendant of his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination."'
However, the fact that there was no constitutional violation did
not answer the question of whether the witness' testimony was to
be excluded because there was still a violation of the Miranda rules.
As the Court stated the issue: "The question for decision is how
sweeping the judicially imposed consequences of this disregard shall
be." 120
In attempting to answer this question, the Court first looked to
whether "the sanction serves a valid and useful purpose,''

and in

112. 19 Mich. App. 320, 172 N.W.2d 712 (1969).
113. 385 Mich. 594, 189 N.W.2d 290 (1971).
114. Tucker v. Johnson, 352 F. Supp. 266 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
115. Tucker v. Johnson, 480 F.2d 927 (6th Cir. 1973).
116. The Court based its conclusion on a finding that the testimony of the defendant
was not compelled even though he had not received the Miranda warnings. Furthermore, the
defendant did not base his argument for relief on the sixth and fourteenth amendments, as

he might have, and therefore the Court avoided any possible questions based on these amendments. 417 U.S. at 438.
117. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974). The Court observed that the
"safeguards were not intended to create a constitutional straight jacket."
118. Id. This holding is vigorously contested by Mr. Justice Douglas in his dissenting
opinion. Douglas argued that the Court could not "prescribe preferred modes of interrogation
absent a constitutional basis." Id. at 462. This whole question of whether a violation of
Miranda rights is a constitutional violation is a separate area that is too extensive for this
comment to attack. However, it is submitted that Douglas' reasoning is well placed.
119. Id. The Court at least conceded that there still cannot be a complete bad faith
disregard of the Miranda "procedural rules."
120. Id. at 445.
121. Id. at 446.
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doing so examined the deterrence factor. The Court put great emphasis on the fact that the arrest was pre-Miranda and that the
officer was apparently acting in good faith under the standards then
in existence.' 2 The court determined that the deterrent effect would
not be significantly augmented by the exclusion of the witness' testimony in this case.'23
Apparently, the Court believed that there was some relation
between "good faith" action and the deterrence factor.' Yet, it is
arguable whether this relation should exist at all." 5 The claim of
good faith or bad faith can always be made, and it is quite difficult
to prove that the action was otherwise. If anything, the emphasis
on good faith will vitiate the deterrence factor because the police
officer will not be deterred when he knows that his later claims of
"good faith" will negate any bad offspring from his violation. It is
difficult to see how deterrence is served here.' 5 This is yet another
instance where the present Court has recognized the existence of a
defendant's rights but taken away from the defendant any vindication of these rights by eroding the exclusionary rule.'27
The Tucker Court also examined the facts in relation to a second justification for the exclusionary rule: protection of the courts
from reliance on untrustworthy evidence. In holding that the evidence in this case was not untrustworthy, the Court emphasized
that the evidence was the testimony of a third party and not that
of the defendant.' The authors agree with the Court that "there
was no reason to believe that the testimony of Henderson was untrustworthy simply because respondent was not advised of his right
122. Id. at 447. In doing so the Court obviously disregarded the holding in Johnson. If
the court did not want the officer in pre-Miranda days to give a complete warning, it would
not have decided as it did in Johnson. The Court in Johnson refused to absolve the police
officers because they had acted in good faith in questioning.
123. Id. at 448.
124. Id. at 447. The Court stated: "Where the official action was pursued in complete
good faith, however, the deterrence rationale loses much of its force."
125. See section III infra for an extensive discussion on this question of the viability of a
"good faith" standard.
126. Pitler rightly observed that: "[lit is clear that if the police were permitted to utilize
illegally obtained confessions for links and leads rather than being required to gather evidence independently, then the Miranda warnings would be of no value in protecting the
privilege against self-incrimination." Pitler, note 15 supra, at 620,
127. The court has also done this in Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975). See text
accompanying notes 180 and 187 infra.
128. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 449 (1974).
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to appointed counsel."' 29 This is simple logic.
In conclusion, the Court resorted to a "balancing test," weighing the strong interest of making all relevant and trustworthy evidence available to the trier of fact and society's interest in effective
criminal prosecution against the need to deter violations of constitutional rights. 3 " The balance in this case was weighted against the
defendant.
It is arguable that the use of a "balancing test" in this context
is without foundation. The need to provide the trier of fact with
trustworthy evidence is of no value in a determination of the extent
of exclusion necessary for the protection of an individual right. The
Supreme Court has admitted in the past that even trustworthy
evidence may have to be excluded.' The only question to be asked
is whether the exclusion of the evidence provides a deterrent to
police misconduct in the future. In Tucker, this question can be
answered in the affirmative.
E.

The Use of Illegally Obtained Evidence For Impeachment
Purposes

The use of illegally obtained evidence for impeachment purposes acts as an exception to the exclusionary rule in its larger
context, rather than to just the "fruit" doctrine. Nevertheless its
ultimate effect upon whether "fruit of the poisonous tree" will be
placed in evidence makes it a germane issue for discussion in this
comment.
The general rule of admissibility for illegally obtained evidence
for purposes of impeaching the credibility of a witness (generally the
defendant) was enunciated in 1925 by a unanimous Supreme Court
in the case of Agnello v. United States,"' where it was held that a
defendant who did not, in his direct examination, testify about an
illegally seized item, could not be cross-examined about that item.'33
129. Id.
130. Id. at 450-51.
131. See, e.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). The sentiments of Mr.
Justice Black somewhat reflect this feeling: "It certainly offends my sense of justice to say
that a State holding in jail people who were convicted by unconstitutional methods has a
vested interest in keeping them there that outweighs the right of persons adjudged guilty
of crime to challenge their unconstitutional convictions at any time." Linkletter v. Walker,
381 U.S. 618, 653 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting).
132. 269 U.S. 20 (1925).
133. In Agnello, the direct examination of the defendant, who was on trial for conspiring
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An exception to the general rule was carved out in Walder v.
United States."I In Walder, the defendant, on trial for the illicit sale
of narcotics, took the stand and on direct examination denied that
he had ever illegally purchased, sold, or possessed narcotics. In fact,
the defendant had been previously indicted for purchasing and possessing heroin. However, the heroin capsule had been suppressed as
a result of an unlawful search and seizure, and the case was subsequently dismissed on the Government's motion. After a subsequent
indictment and conviction, the Court held that the Government
could introduce evidence of the heroin capsule after the defendant
had denied on cross-examination that any narcotics were taken from
him at the time of the unlawful search, provided that the jury was
instructed that the evidence was only to be considered for purposes
of impeaching the defendant's credibility and not for proof of guilt
of the crime for which he was then being charged." 5
Walder was distinguished from Agnello on the basis that where
the defendant "[o]f his own accord" goes "beyond a mere denial
of complicity in the crimes of which he was charged" and makes a
"sweeping claim," the government may "introduce by way of rebuttal evidence illegally secured by it . . . . ,,"However, the Court in
Walder explicitly reaffirmed the general rule laid down in Agnello:
that the defendant could not be impeached by illegally seized evidence about which he did not testify.' 7
A further distinction, unarticulated between Agnello
and
Walder is that Agnello concerned the very narcotics which the de-

fendant was charged with conspiring to sell. Thus evidence of those
narcotics was inextricably tied to the question'of guilt or innocence,
whereas in Walder the defendant had placed his character and reputation generally in issue. This distinction is well based in deterrence
to sell narcotics, did not include testimony about his possession of narcotics. The Government, after having failed in its efforts to introduce narcotics that had been unlawfully seized
in its case-in-chief, asked the defendant on cross-examination if he had ever seen narcotics
before. The question was answered in the negative, and the Government then attempted to
introduce evidence of the narcotics. The Agnello Court rejected this attempt at impeachment,
reasoning that the defendant had done "nothing to waive his constitutional protection or to
justify cross-examination in respect of the evidence claimed to have been obtained by the
search." Id. at 35.
134. 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
135. Walder was recently followed in Cowan v. United States, 331 A.2d 323 (D.C. 1975).
136. 347 U.S. at 65.
137. Id.
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theory. There is much less incentive for the police illegally to obtain
evidence for impeachment purposes in a case that may or may not
arise, than in a case in which the tainted evidence is related to an
essential element of the charged crime.' 8
Walder was significantly extended in Harris v. New York 3 '
where it was held that trustworthy statements, though obtained in
violation of Miranda,"10 may be used to attack the credibility of the
defendant if he takes the stand."' The statements were regarded as
trustworthy because the petitioner did not claim they were coerced
or involuntary."' The Court relied primarily upon Walder in deciding Harris, suggesting that it was merely following a general rule
laid down in the earlier case and slightly extending it. Only one
138. Pitler, supra note 15, at 631.
139. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
140. In Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974), the Court found it unnecessary to
decide "the broad question" of whether the fruits of statements taken in violation of the
Miranda rules must be excluded regardless of when the interrogation took place. It placed
its holding on a narrower ground: Testimony of a prosecution witness discovered by the police
as a result of a pre-Miranda interrogation of defendant without giving him all the warnings
required thereby may be used in a post-Mirandatrial. However, language in Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion strongly indicated that the Court would decline to apply the fruits
of the poisonous tree doctrine to witnesses located as a result of post-Miranda questioning
conducted in violation of that case, at least where the police acted in "complete good faith."
See text accompanying notes 109-31, supra, and note 184 infra.
141. The relevant facts in Harris are as follows: Defendant was arrested and taken to
police headquarters where he was questioned about alleged drug transactions. He was given
"no warning of a right to appointed counsel." 401 U.S. at 224. During the questioning
he
indicated that he would "rather see a lawyer before I keep on." 401 U.S. 222, app. at 74. He
subsequently indicated that he would be satisfied to see a lawyer "tomorrow." Id. Nevertheless, the questioning continued and the defendant made certain incriminating statements.
It should be noted that while the questioning took place before the Court's decision in
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the trial was held after it. Thus, under Johnson v.

New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (19g6), the Miranda ruleg were applicable.
At his trial for two counts of drug sale, petitioner took the stand and denied committing
the alleged crimes. On cross-examination, and over defendant's objection, some incriminating
statements from the pre-trial interrogation were read, and defendant was asked if he remembered them. He replied that he remembered some but not others. 401 U.S. 222, app. at 5863. The jury was instructed that it could consider the contents of the pre-trial statement solely
for purposes of evaluating the defendant's "believability." 401 U.S. 222; app. at 95. The jury
convicted him on the second count but was unable to agree on the first. The New York
appellate courts affirmed the conviction. People v. Harris, 31 App. Div. 2d 828, 298 N.Y.S.2d
245, afi'd, 25 N.Y.2d 175, 250 N.E.2d 349, 303 N.Y.S.2d 71 (1969) (per curiam).
142. For an extensive analysis and sharp criticism of Harris, see Dershowitz and Ely,
Harris v. New York: Some Anxious Observations on the Candor and Logic of the Emerging
Nixon Majority, 80 YALE L.J. 1198 (1971). Therein, it is rather persuasively argued that the
Court misstated the record and that there was a claim made that the statements were
involuntary. Id. at 1201-05.
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distinction between the two cases was acknowledged by the Court,
and it was summarily dismissed:
It is true that Walder was impeached as to collateral matters
included in his direct examination, whereas petitioner here was
impeached as to testimony bearing more directly on the crimes
charged. We are not persuaded that there is a difference in principle that warrants a result different from that reached by the
Court in Walder. "I
It would appear that .the Court should have attached greater significance to this distinction.
The risk that the jury might interpret the impeaching evidence
as indicating the defendant's guilt is substantially reduced when the
evidence does not relate to the crime charged."' Indeed, this is the

very difference that was successfully argued by the Government in
Walder. The Government pointed out in their brief that in Agnello
the suppressed evidence was so closely related in point of time to

the offense charged that there was a real danger that the suppressed evidence would be considered by the jury as proof of guilt,
as of affirmative benefit to the Government. No such danger
existed here, since the suppressed evidence related to a point in
time remote from the offenses charged.' 45
Although it may be contended that any infirmity may be remedied by limiting instructions to the jury, the Court has wisely, in
past decisions, stated that "the risk that the jury will not, or cannot,
follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so
vital to the defendant, that the practical and human limitations of
the jury system cannot be ignored,"' 46 and consequently a limiting
instruction cannot be relied upon when a confession or admission of
the crime at issue is involved.'47
A second distinction between Walder and Harris (which the
majority did not recognize) is that in Harris the defendant simply
took the stand to deny the elements of the crime charged while in
143. 401 U.S. at 225.
144. Dershowitz and Ely, supra note 142, at 1215-16.
145. Brief for the United States at 32-33, Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954),
appearingin Dershowitz and Ely, supra note 142, at 1216.
146. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135 (1968). But cf. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S.
74 (1970).
147. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
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Walder the defendant went beyond that to the considerable extent
of perjury on direct examination on matters collateral to the crime
charged.'45 There should be a difference between these two situations in regard to where illegally obtained evidence can be used to
impeach a defendant. It is this very distinction that Justice Frankfurter relied upon in carving the Walder exception out of the general
rule of Agnello. 4 In short, the evidence in Walder tended solely to
impeach the defendant's testimony and was completely unrelated
to the indictment and did not interfere with his freedom to deny any
of the elements of the crime with which he was charged, whereas the
statement used for impeachment in Harris was directly related to
the case against the defendant.
Therefore, it appears that Harris is factually much more like
Agnello than Walder. Accordingly, Agnello should have been followed. Although the Harris Court stated that it was extending
Walder, it was actually overruling AgnelIo sub silentio.'50
A third distinction between Walder and Harris is that Walder

involved impeachment by means of evidence obtained in violation
of the fourth amendment which does not have its own exclusionary
rule but rather a court-fashioned one to be implemented in cases of
illegal searches and seizures. 5 ' Harris, on the other hand, involved
a statement illegally obtained in violation of the fifth amendment,
which has its own exclusionary rule.' Accordingly, the Court would
148. Harrisseems to put to rest a questionable rule under which a distinction was drawn
between statements which were inculpatory per se and those which were not (i.e., dealing
with collateral matters) in regard to their admissibility for impeachment purposes. See, e.g.,
Tate v. United States, 283 F.2d 377 (D.C. Cir. 1960). This distinction, however, showed itself
to be elusive in subsequent cases where it was no easy matter to decide whether the defendant's testimony bears on the central issues of the case or pertains to collateral matters. See
State v. Brewton, 247 Ore. 241, 422 P.2d 581 (rejecting the middle ground suggested by Tate
and holding that a defendant who takes the stand may not be impeached with the fruits of
an unconstitutional interrogation), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 943 (1967). The Tate exception to
the exclusionary rule had been held by many courts not to apply to statements obtained in
violation of Miranda. E.g., Proctor v. United States, 404 F.2d 819 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Blair v.
United States, 401 F.2d 387 (D.C. Cir. 1968); United States v. Fox, 403 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1968);
Groshart v. United States, 392 F.2d 172 (9th Cir. 1968); Wheeler v. United States, 382 F.2d
998 (10th Cir. 1967); Commonwealth v. Padgett, 428 Pa. 229, 237 A.2d 209 (1968). Harris,
however, takes the opposite pole, admitting all statements for impeachment purposes if not
coerced, regardless of any central-collateral issue distinction.
149. 347 U.S. at 65.
150. It has been suggested that Harris squarely overruled Agnelo. Dershowitz and Ely,
supra note 142, at 1213.
151. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
152. See, e.g., Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896). The relevant portion of the fifth
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seem less justified in carving exceptions out of the fifth amend-

ment's exclusionary rule than the fourth's.
Furthermore, the fact that evidence was secured in violation of
the fourth amendment does not cast doubt upon its reliability; but
the trustworthiness of evidence obtained in violation of the fifth
amendment is highly suspect. Although this is somewhat less true
for statements obtained in violation of the Miranda rules as contrasted to cases where actual coercion is present, an important purpose of the Miranda rules was "to guarantee that the accused gives
a fully accurate statement to the police."' 53
Harrisis also subject to criticism as constituting an erosion of
Miranda. Miranda had explicitly rejected distinctions based on the
manner in which a statement is used or the degree to which it is
helpful to the prosecution: The Court regarded those statements as
"incriminating in any meaningful sense of the word," and required
the same warnings and effective waiver as with other statements. 5 ,
Thus, it would seem that Miranda's references to "exculpatory"
statements were intended to cover the type of statement at issue in
Harris. Therefore, Harris constitutes an exception to Miranda
where statements are used for impeachment purposes. 55 The Harris
decision was influenced by policy considerations. The Court believed that the benefit of increasing the jury's ability to assess the
petitioner's credibility outweighed any speculative cost of increasing police misconduct. The Court reasoned that the state's inability
to use the evidence for nonimpeachment purposes would act as a
sufficient deterrent. 5 This reasoning is subject to the criticism that
"there is no reason to expect an exclusionary rule to deter deliberate
amendment reads as follows: "nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself." U.S. CONST. amend. V. Thus, the fifth amendment seems on its face to
prohibit the Government from using compelled statements "against" the defendant. Dershowitz and Ely, supra note 142, at 1214-15. See Pitler, supra note 15, at 619-20. In Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 586 (1892), the fifth amendment was held to protect "against
that use of compelled testimony which consists in gaining therefrom a knowledge of the
details of the crime, and of sources of information which may supply other means of convicting the witness or party." Cf. Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219 (1968), discussed in
Note, The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, 82 HARV. L. REV. 63, 220-22-(1968).
153. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 470 (1966); cf. Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S.
719 (1966).
154. 384 U.S. at 476-77.
155. The Harris Court did not believe that Miranda precluded use of the statement at
issue in Harris. 407 U.S. at 224. See Dershowitz and Ely, supra note 142 at 1208-11.
156. 401 U.S. at 225.
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violations unless it has eliminated all significant incentives toward
such conduct."' 57 The result arrived at in Harris creates a situation
whereby once the police feel that they have enough admissible evidence to establish a prima facie case, they lave an incentive to carry
out questioning in violation of Miranda when they determine that

the probability is low of obtaining any useful statements or admissions if the Miranda warnings are given.'58 If the defendant then
makes a statement, the police will have in their possession evidence
that they would not have obtained had they complied with
Miranda, and which can be used to impeach the defendant if he
takes the stand. In this way, the defendant may be effectively deterred from testifying in his own behalf.
The Court further justified the use of evidence for impeachment
purposes on the ground that the petitioner did not have the right to
commit perjury.'59 Of course there is no "right to commit perjury."
To state this is merely to avoid the issue. The problem is where to
strike the balance between the state's interest in challenging the
157. Dershowitz and Ely, supra note 142, at 1219. However, it has been contended that
a random percentage exclusion in search and seizure cases would provide a sufficient deterrent. Amsterdam, Search, Seizure, and Section 2255: A Comment, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 378,
388-91 (1964). But see note 158 infra.
158. The Miranda situation is unlike the typical search and seizure situation
in that it is tailor-made for a sequential "try it legally-if you fail, try it illegally"
approach. That is, the police can attempt to obtain a statement admissible in the
case in chief by giving the.required warnings. If, however, the suspect requests a
lawyer, they can then (instead of honoring the request and thereby losing the
statement [because once the lawyer arrives there is little chance that further
questioning will be permitted]) go on-given Harris-totry for an uncounseled
statement to use for impeachment.
Dershowitz and Ely, supra note 142, at 1220 n.90; see Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975),
discussed infra in text accompanying notes 163-67. Therefore, a random percentage exclusion
is not suited for fifth amendment Miranda violations, since the elimination of all incentives
is necessary in cases of deliberate misconduct, where the police know that the only way of
securing evidence is to violate the rules.
Where the primary illegality is a fourth amendment search and seizure violation, there
is a greater probability that the police misconduct was unintentional. Since these cases do
not present the situation where the police have much to gain and very little to lose, and do
not involve a conscious "yes-no" decision on the part of the police, sufficient deterrence might
be accomplished by a random percentage exclusion. However, the random percentage exclusion is less responsive even in those instances where the search and seizure violation has
intentional elements to it. Moreover, by increasing the probability of exclusion, there is a
significant likelihood that a greater measure of deterrence would result through the general
educative process of sensitizing the police to the limits of the fourth amendment and the
exclusionary rule which is the force that gives it effect.
159. 401 U.S. at 225.
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defendant's credibility and the defendant's interest in excluding
illegally secured evidence." 0
Although a strong case can be made for the proposition that the
Harrisdecision is analytically deficient and arrives at an undesirable result, as well as for the correlative proposition that Walder
should have been confined to its narrow grounds, Harris is the law
of the land. It should be borne in mind, however, that a statement
obtained in violation of Miranda is, under the interpretation given
Harris by most courts, not admissible for impeachment purposes
unless the statement is shown to have been given voluntarily and
free from coercion'' in light of traditional notions of due process-totality of circumstance standards." 2 Therefore, case by case
adjudication now appears to be the rule rather than the exception
when it comes to Harris-type situations.
Harris was extended by the Court in Oregon v. Hass, 3 which
160. It should be noted that Harrisdid not purport to extend Walder in the context of
fourth amendment cases where the primary illegality is an unlawful search and seizure, i.e.,
where the defendant has placed his character in issue by his perjury by going beyond a mere
denial of the elements of the crime charged on direct examination. See Pitler, supra note 15,
at 633-36.
However, the possibility that a broad interpretation will be given to Harris so as to
include fourth amendment situations should not be dismissed, i.e., evidence and the fruits
thereof that have been arrived at through a fourth amendment violation would be admissible
for purposes of impeachment if the defendant takes the stand when (a) proper limiting
instructions are given to the jury, and (b) the evidence is vested with indicia of "reliability"
as was the case in Harris (not coerced). The interesting questions arise in connection with
(b). First, physical evidence which is the product of an illegal arrest or search and seizure
does not generally present the questions that a coerced or involuntary confession presents.
Thus, upon this reasoning, such physical evidence would be even more likely to be admissible
for impeachment purposes than a statement obtained in the face of a Miranda violation, since
the requirement of Miranda warnings was predicated on the inherently coercive nature of
custodial interrogation which may give rise to unreliability. Second, a statement or confession
that is the fruit of an illegal search and seizure is open to serious questions as to reliability.
The suspect is likely to assume the frame of mind that "they've got the goods on me so I might
as well talk." Since this type of situation has an inherently coercive coloring to it, the
reliability of any statement arising out of it should be suspect. People v. Johnson, 70 Cal.2d
541, 450 P.2d 865, 75 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1969). Unreliability, of course, would be heightened if
there were oppressive circumstances surrounding the fourth amendment violation since it
would enhance the coercive atmosphere.
161. E.g., LaFrance v. Bohlinger, 499 F.2d 29 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1080
(1975); United States v. McQueen, 458 F.2d 1049 (3d Cir. 1972); State v. Williams, 271 So.
2d 857 (La. 1973); State v. Gabler, 294 Minn. 457, 199 N.W.2d 439 (1972); State v. Kassow,
28 Ohio St. 2d 141, 277 N.E.2d 435 (1971); Upchurch v. State, 64 Wis. 2d 553, 219 N.W.2d
363 (1974). But see Rooks v. State, 250 Ark. 561, 466 S.W.2d 478 (1971).
162. Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959); see Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493
(1967).
163. 420 U.S. 714 (1975).
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held admissible for impeachment purposes a statement made after
full Miranda warnings were given. The arrestee requested to speak
with his attorney but was not allowed to do so until after he reached
the police station."4
The reasoning that the Court relied upon was the same as in
Harris-application of the exclusionary rule would promote perjury
and defeat the truth-finding purposes of the trial while providing an
insufficient deterrent to future Miranda violations. The majority
also appeared to find it important that any follow-up investigation
by the officer was conducted in an absence of bad faith even though
it contravened the defendant's Mirandarights. This is analagous to
the finding in Harris that the statements were not involuntary or
coerced, and thus the impeaching evidence in both Harrisand Hass
was not unreliable. The dissenters protested that the police would
now have an incentive to continue questioning after the suspect has
made a request for a lawyer." 5 However, the majority termed this
possibility as merely "speculative," and stated that since there was
no intentional abuse in Hass, such a determination would have to
await scrutiny in a later case.
Although critics of Harris will no doubt be even more unhappy
with Hass, the two opinions, taken together, seem to indicate that
the Court will draw the line, as far as admissibility for impeachment
purposes is concerned, when the police engage in bad faith or coercive conduct. Thus, proponents of these opinions may contend that
the pronouncements of the Court are not invitations to blatant
police misconduct, and therefore do not impinge upon the deterrent
effect of the exclusionary rule. However, it is not unreasonable to
argue that even if the police misconduct is inadvertent, such future
164. The relevant facts in Hass were as follows: The officer arrested the defendant at
his home for the theft of two bicycles. After properly giving the defendant his Miranda
warnings, the officer proceeded to question him about the theft of one of the two bicycles.
The defendant admitted that he had taken two bicycles, but stated that he was not sure
which one the officer was referring to. He further stated that he had returned one of them
and that the other one was where he had left it. The officer then requested the defendant to
accompany him to the site where the bicycle had been left. The defendant agreed, and they
departed in the patrol car. On the way to the site, the defendant had some misgivings,
indicating that he "was in a lot of trouble" and wanted to telephone his attorney. The officer
responded that he could telephone the attorney as soon as they got to the station. They
proceeded with the investigation by continuing to drive to the site, whereupon the defendant
pointed out a place in the brush where the bicycle was found. 420 U.S. at 715-17.
165. 420 U.S. at 724 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see note 158 supra, where this situation
is discussed in detail.
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misconduct would be deterred by barring the fruits thereof from
admissibility regardless of whether they are inadmissible in the
case-in-chief or on cross-Ixamination when used for impeachment
purposes.
Moreover, it has been compellingly argued that the judiciary
must "avoid even the slightest appearance of sanctioning illegal
government conduct."'6 6 "[Ilt is monstrous that courts should aid
or abet the law-breaking police officer. It is abiding truth that
'[n]othing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure
to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its
own existence.' "1167
Miranda warnings within the impeachment context came before the Court again in United States v. Hale.' In Hale, the Court
held that it was reversible error to permit attempted impeachment
of the defendant on cross-examination concerning his silence during
police interrogation after having been advised of his Miranda right
to remain silent. The Court did not reach the constitutional question of whether Miranda mandates such a result, but decided the
case in exercise of its supervisory authority over the lower federal
courts. The Court reasoned that silence during custodial interrogation, in light of the inherent pressures of in custody interrogation
and the fact that defendant was particularly aware of his right to
remain silent, having just been given his Miranda warnings, was
just as probative of defendant's reliance upon the right to remain
silent as to support the conclusion that the defendant's testimony
at trial was a later fabrication inconsistent with his prior silence. In
the midst of the emotional and confusing circumstances surround-

ing custodial interrogation, the innocent and guilty alike might very

well remain silent as a psychological reaction.' 9 Furthermore, the
fact of defendant's silence when he was arrested generally is not a
good indication of his credibility. There is also the risk that the jury
166. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 360 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting);
quoted in Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 724, (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
167. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 232 (1971) (Brennan, J. dissenting), quoted in
Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. at 724 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
168. 422 U.S. 171 (1975), noted in 30 U. MIAMI L. REV. 773 (1976).
169. 422 U.S. at 176-80; see Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391 (1957); Traynor,

The Devils of Due Process in Criminal Detection, Detention, and Trial, 33 U.
657, 676 (1966).

CHI.

L. REv.

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:615

may attach greater significance to defendant's silence than it de-

serves. '70
It is submitted, however, that it would have been appropriate
for the Court to decide Hale on constitutional grounds.' 7' As Justice
Douglas stated in his concurring opinion,' 7 there is no circumstance
in which the Government would be justified in using the constitutional privilege of the right to remain silent' to discredit, impeach,
or ultimately convict a person who asserts it.' 74 Therefore, this case
should have been controlled by Miranda.The Court there ruled that
"it is impermissible to penalize an individual for exercising his fifth
amendment privilege . . . ."I This is consistent with the Supreme
Court's proscription of judicial or prosecutorial comment on defendant's failure to testify at trial, on the ground that such comment
"cuts down on the privilege by making its assertion costly."'7 " Analogously, where the defendant was informed of and exercised his
right to remain silent during custodial interrogation, prosecutorial
comment on defendant's silence, as an attack upon his trial testimony, does not comport with any notion of due process. '
Nor would it appear that Harris, or its progeny Hass, would
mandate a contrary result. Harris is distinguishable because it dealt
with prior statements unquestionably inconsistent, in part at least,
with that which the defendant later testified to at the trial. The
Court in Hale did not find inconsistency between the defendant's
silence during custodial interrogation and his alibi at the trial.,
170. 422 U.S. at 180. "When the risk of confusion is so great as to upset the balance of
advantage, the evidence goes out." Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96, 104 (1933).
171. Chief Justice Burger, who concurred separately, viewed the case as "something of
a tempest-in-a-saucer" and felt that the Court rightly avoided placing the result on constitutional grounds. 422 U.S. at 181. "The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question
although properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon
which the case may be disposed of." Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis,
J., concurring).
172. 422 U.S. at 182, (Douglas J., concurring).
173. "No person shall . . . be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself ....
" U.S. CONST. amend. V; see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
174. Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 425 (1957) (Black, J., concurring).
175. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468 n.37 (1966).
176. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965) (dictum); United States v. Anderson,
498 F.2d 1038, 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1974), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171
(1975).
177. 422 U.S. at 182-83 (White, J., concurring). Cf. Johnson v. United States, 318 U.S.
189, 196-99 (1943).
178. In the Hale opinion, it was stated that as a basic rule of evidence, the court must
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Harris is also distinguishable on the grounds that therein the accused spoke rather than exercise his constitutional right to remain
silent. In contrast, in Hale, the defendant explicitly availed himself
of his right to remain silent.'7
III.

THE EMERGING SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PURPOSEFULNESS OF THE

PRIMARY ILLEGALITY IN DETERMINING THE EXTENT OF THE TAINT

The recent Supreme Court decision of Brown v. Illinois' signaled the emerging significance of the purposefulness of the official
misconduct with respect to determining how far the taint has
spread. As the Court stated "particularly, the purpose and flagrancy
of the official misconduct [is] relevant."'' Moreover, in United
States v. Peltier,"2 a case decided the day before Brown, the Court,

in an opinion by Justice Rehnquist, signaled that the exclusionary
rule in search and seizure cases should be applied only if it
can be said that the officer had knowledge, or can be charged with
knowledge, that the search was unconstitutional under the fourth
amendment.' 3 Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in Michigan v.

be persuaded that the statements at issue were indeed inconsistent before an asserted prior
inconsistent statement can be admitted into evidence to impeach the credibility of a witness.
422 U.S. at 176; 3A J.WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1040 (Chadbourn rev. 1970). It was further stated
that "[ilf
the Government fails to establish a threshold inconsistency between silence at the
police station and later exculpatory testimony at trial, proof of silence lacks any significant
probative value and must therefore be excluded." 422 U.S. at 176. The Court subsequently
found that this threshold inconsistency was not demonstrated. Id. at 177-79. This would
certainly seem to be close enough to the concept of "no inconsistency" so as to provide a valid
basis for distinction.
179. United States v. Anderson, 498 F.2d 1038, 1043 (1974). In pointing out this distinction, the authors do not indicate approval of the Harris decision.
180. 422 U.S. 590 (1975).
181. Id. at 604; see United States v. Edmons, 432 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1970). See also United
States, ex rel. Gockley v. Myers, 450 F.2d 232, 236 (3d Cir. 1971), cert.denied, 404 U.S. 1063
(1972); United States v. Kilgen, 445 F.2d 287, 289 (5th Cir. 1971). The Brown Court, in dicta,
applied the criteria of purposefulness to the facts of the case.
The illegality here, moreover, had a quality of purposefulness. The impropriety
of the arrest was obvious; awareness of that fact was virtually conceded by the
two detectives . . . .The arrest, both in design and in execution, was investigatory. The detectives embarked upon this expedition for evidence in the hope that
something might turn up. The manner in which [the defendant's arrest was
effected gives the appearance of having been calculated to cause surprise, fright,
and confusion.
422 U.S. at 605.
182. 422 U.S. 531 (1975).
183. Id. at 542. Cf. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347-48 (1974); Schneckloth
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Tucker 4 also emphasized in dicta that the Court would decline to
apply the "fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine" to witnesses located
as a product of custodial interrogation conducted in violation of
Miranda, at least in those instances where the police acted in
"complete good faith."
The desirability of injecting "purposefulness" into the Wong
Sun determination is contingent upon how it is used. If it is merely
used as another factor, along with and coequal to other factors, in
determining the spread of the taint, any deleterious effect will probably be minimal. 5 In some situations, it might arguably take more
to attenuate a causal chain that has had as its impetus a flagrant
and purposeful violation of the fourth amendment than one which
did not. For instance, where the primary illegality is a flagrant and
abusive arrest or search and seizure which induces the defendant to
confess, subsequent confessions and/or inculpatory trial testimony
of the defendant are more likely to be tainted than if the primary
illegality was of a less oppressive nature. ' "
To give preeminence to the purposeful nature of the violation' 7
over other factors to be considered in resolving the attenuation question, however, will seriously distort the careful case-by-case inquiry
mandated by Wong Sun.' Indeed, in Wong Sun Justice Brennan
v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 250 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring). Although similar, the
application of a purposefulness-bad faith requirement to the Wong Sun attenuation question
on one hand and as a threshold requirement to the invocation of the exclusionary rule on the
other, raises two separate and distinct issues, the latter of which is beyond the scope of this
comment. In relation to the exclusionary rule, such a requirement has met with strong
criticism. United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 551,52 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting). It
nevertheless seems to stand a very good chance of becoming the law of the land. Id.
184. 417 U.S. 433 (1974); see note 144 supra, and text accompanying notes 110-31.
185. See ALl MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 290.2(2) (Off. Draft No. 1,
1972) cited as § 8.02(2) (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1971) in Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics
Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 424 (Appendix to Opinion of Burger, C.J., dissenting), which takes into
account a number of factors besides "the extent to which the violation was willful" in determining whether the exclusionary rule should be invoked.
186. See People v. Johnson, 70 Cal. 2d 541, 450 P.2d 865, 75 Cal. Rptr. 401, (1969).
187. In light of the word "particularly" which prefaced the Court's remarks on purposefulness, see text accompanying note 181 supra, as well as the general high regard in which
the majority of the Court holds this concept in relation to the invocation of the exclusionary
rule as a whole, see text accompanying notes 182-84 supra, this prospect might very well be
more than mere scholastic conjecture. Such misgivings are also strongly suggested by Justice
Powell's concurring opinion in Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 606-16 (1975). Hopefully,
however, the Court will follow its Brown holding and not make any single factor determinative
of the attenuation issue.
188. People v. Johnson, 70 Cal. 2d 541, 450 P.2d 865, 75 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1969).
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FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS TREE

clearly indicated that the "oppressive circumstances" surrounding
a declaration are not to be seized upon to distinguish the case.,"
Moreover, such a revision would require the judge in each case to
determine the threshold question of what the official's state of mind
was at the time of the commission of the primary illegality. This
distinction would make the application of the Wong Sun doctrine
hinge upon highly nebulous criteria and add a new layer of mandatory fact-finding upon courts presented with motions to suppress.,"
Such a rule would permit excessive subjectivity and discretion on
the part of the trial judge. Furthermore, it would be extremely diffi-

cult to draw any meaningful lines of distinction between purposeful
and nonpurposeful violations. Such an approach would generate
widespread uncertainty as to what activity would result in the exclusion of evidence. Law enforcement officials, as a result, would
find it difficult to establish workable rules and convenient to disregard constitutional proscriptions.' Such uncertainty as to what is
purposeful would add to the difficulty of proving that a police officer
deliberately violated fourth amendment rights, thereby giving rise
to the undesirable possibility of the wholesale affirmance of violations."'
An additional consideration is that questions of purposefulness
or good faith do not lend themselves to adequate appellate review,
since the testimony and demeanor of the police officer could be
reflected on appeal only by a "cold record."' 93
The advantage of the exclusionary rule-entirely apart from any
direct deterrent effect-is that it provides an occasion for judicial
review, and it gives credibility to the constitutional guarantees.
By demonstrating that society will attach serious consequences
189. 371 U.S. at 486, n.12 (1963). A number of courts have interpreted Wong Sun to
exclude incriminating statements following an unlawful arrest only when oppressive events
cause the statements and the arrest to become inextricably intertwined. See Pitler, supra note
15, at 595 and cases cited at n.80. See also Ruffin, Out On a Limb of the Poisonous Tree:
The Tainted Witness, 15 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 32, 65-66 & n.120 (1967). "[Fllagrantly abusive
violations of Fourth Amendment rights, on the one hand, and 'technical' Fourth Amendment
violations, on the other . . .call for significantly different judicial responses." Brown v.
Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 610 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring in part).
190. United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Kaplan, The
Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1027, 1045 (1974).
191. Pitler, supra note 15, at 583.
192. Id. at 584.
193. Id. at 583-84. See Kaplan, supra note 190, at 1045.
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to the violation of constitutional rights, the exclusionary rule
invokes and magnifies the moral and educative force of the law.'
The argument that only fruit which is the product of purposeful
violations should be suppressed, because only these cases further

the deterrent purpose behind the exclusionary rule, ig not convincing. The reasoning behind this argument is as follows: Under the
fourth amendment, the essence of the constitutional wrong lies in
the initial invasion of person or property; the exclusionary rule, as
originally conceived, was a means of deterring this invasion; if the
invasion was purposeful the officer had knowledge that an improper
act was being committed; since the officer knew that he was committing a constitutional violation, imposing the sanction of suppression will be meaningful and deter similar violations in the future.
The exclusionary rule, however, does not depend on the punishment of individual law enforcement officials. Deterrence can operate in several ways, the simplest being special or specific deterrence-punishing an individual so that he will not repeat the same
behavior. But
[t]he exclusionary rule is not aimed at special deterrence since
it does not impose any direct punishment on a law enforcement
official who has broken the rule. . . . The exclusionary rule is
aimed at affecting the wider audience of law enforcement officials
and society at large. It is meant to discourage violations by individuals who have never experienced any sanction for them. 9 5
The exclusionary rule focuses upon general, not specific, deterrence.
It depends not upon threatening a sanction for lack of compliance
but upon removing an inducement to violate fourth amendment
rights.9 "' To admit the fruits of an unconstitutional search and seizure into evidence, regardless of whether they were obtained purposefully, is not merely to tolerate but also to induce such unconstitutional conduct by the police.
194. Oaks, Studving the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV.
665, 756 (1970).
195. Id. at 709-10. See also Amsterdam, supra note 157, at 431.
196. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960); United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S.
531, 556-57 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting).

